What Were They Thinking?: Competing Culpability Standards For Punishing Threats Made To The President by Principe, Craig Matthew
American University Criminal Law Brief 
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 4 
2012 
What Were They Thinking?: Competing Culpability Standards For 
Punishing Threats Made To The President 
Craig Matthew Principe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Principe, Craig Matthew. "What Were They Thinking?: Competing Culpability Standards For Punishing 
Threats Made To The President." American University Criminal Law Brief 7, no. 2 (2012): 39-54. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Criminal Law Brief 39
CRAIG MATTHEW PRINCIPE1
What Were They Thinking?: Competing Culpability  
Standards For Punishing Threats Made To The President
I. INTRODUCTION
18 U.S.C. Section 871(a) criminalizes the act of making threats to kill, injure, or kidnap the President of the United States and a few other officials who are close in the line of succession.2 In its 1970 panel and 
1971 en banc decisions in United States v. Patillo,3 the Fourth 
Circuit became the first to adopt a subjective construction of 
Section 871(a), creating its infamous “present intent” require-
ment.4 All other circuits presented with the task of interpreting 
Section 871(a), have adopted an objective construction of the 
statute, which translates into a negligence standard for a criminal 
statute—something criminal law typically disapproves of.5 The 
result is a heavily imbalanced “circuit split” with only the Fourth 
Circuit taking an independent stand on the issue of criminal 
culpability for threats made under Section 871(a).6
Although this division has per-
sisted for over thirty-five years without 
resolution,7 recent events force us 
to reexamine the issue of the proper 
culpability standard for the threats 
against the president statute. On January 
8, 2011, a gunman attempted to shoot and 
kill Arizona Representative Gabrielle 
Giffords at a public event.8 Investigators 
identified Representative Giffords 
as the target of the attack and noted 
that the congresswoman had received 
numerous threats.9 While Representative 
Giffords was very fortunate to survive 
the shooting despite serious injuries, 
several other bystanders were injured and tragically killed, 
including Chief Judge John M. Roll of the District Court 
for Arizona, and nine-year old Christina Taylor Green.10 It 
remains unclear whether the gunman, twenty-two-year-old 
Jared Lee Loughner, was motivated by politics11 or a personal 
nihilistic desire to create chaos.12 Pima County Sheriff Clarence 
W. Dupnik caused controversy by blaming the shooting on 
“vitriolic rhetoric” and a toxic political environment in 
Arizona.13 Regardless of Loughner’s motivation, this tragic 
event in Arizona has prompted Congress to amend the “Threats 
against the President” statute to encompass members of 
Congress or members-of-Congress-elect.14 If this amendment 
passes, the scope of this statute would expand, from two to four 
persons at any given time to well over five hundred.15 Thus, the 
debate over whether the “willfully” element of Section 871(a) 
requires a subjective or objective construction has taken on a 
new significance and needs to be addressed in light of these 
developments.
This Article examines the holding of United States v. Patillo 
and argues that if Congress amends Section 871(a), it should 
also clarify the culpability standard for the statute. Specifically, 
Congress must address what is meant by “willfully” and should 
adopt the original holding of Patillo as the proper standard for 
threats against the President. This analysis will reveal that the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Patillo, like many other holdings 
in threats cases, has been largely misinterpreted. A crucial 
misunderstanding is that the present intent requirement applies 
to all Section 871(a) cases.16 A primary 
objective here is to parse out the core 
holding of Patillo to delineate how the 
Fourth Circuit identified a factual di-
chotomy of Section 871(a) cases where 
the present intent standard applies to just 
one of the two parts.17 This Article also 
includes an empirical study of outcomes 
in Section 871(a) threats cases, in order 
to assess whether having two different 
mens rea standards is problematic and 
if so, which construction of Section 
871(a)—subjective or objective—is 
preferable.
The study compares outcomes 
under the Fourth Circuit’s subjective standard with outcomes 
under the other circuits’ objective standard by using data 
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Federal Criminal Case 
Processing Statistics Database.18 Theoretically, a subjec-
tive standard essentially mandates that prosecutors prove an 
additional specific intent requirement. Regardless of how the 
requirement is defined,19 that additional element would make 
it harder for prosecutors to prove their case. This in turn would 
affect defendants’ decisions with respect to plea bargains. Thus, 
this study looks at three measures that could indicate whether 
the difference between a subjective regime and an objective 
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or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. 
But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an 
act done with a bad purpose,” which correlates to criminal 
blameworthiness.26
B. CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF  
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 871
The Threats against the President statute was passed on 
February 14, 1917.27 The law has been on the books for almost 
one hundred years, yet the original language is essentially the 
same as it was then.28 Most significantly, Congress used the same 
“knowingly and willfully” language that appears in the statute 
today.29 At that time, three United States Presidents had been 
assassinated in office: Abraham Lincoln in 1865, James Garfield 
in 1881, and William McKinley in 1901.30 Theodore Roosevelt, 
who became President upon the assassination of McKinley, was 
also the target of a failed assassination attempt while running 
for a third term in 1912 on the Progressive ticket.31 Such events 
undoubtedly influenced the House Judiciary Committee mem-
bers that sponsored the law. In fact, the committee report stated 
that the bill, H.R. 15314, was “designed to restrain and punish 
those who would threaten to take the life of, or inflict bodily 
harm upon, the President of this Republic.”32 The report also 
stated, “It is the first and highest duty of a Government to 
protect its governmental agencies, in the performance of their 
public services, from threats of violence which would tend to 
coerce them or restrain them in the performance of their duties.”33
During debates in the House of Representatives, the chief 
sponsor of the bill, Representative Edwin Yates Webb,34 was 
forced to defend the “willfully” phraseology.35 As Chairman 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, he was intimately 
familiar with the bill.36 After the bill was read by the Clerk, 
Representative Raker asked Webb whether, “in line 3 the words 
‘and willfully’ and the same words in lines 8 and 9 ought to be 
stricken from the bill, for the reason that if a man knowing [sic] 
does an act, that ought to be sufficient to punish him.”37 Webb 
responded:
I do not think so . . . I think he ought to be shown to 
have done it willfully. I think it must be a willful intent 
to do serious injury to the President. If you make it 
a mere technical offense, you do not give him much 
of a chance when he comes to answer before a court 
and jury. I do not think we ought to be too anxious to 
convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly. I think 
it ought to be a willful expression of an intent to carry 
out a threat against the Executive, and I hope that the 
gentleman will not offer his amendment.38
Webb expressed his belief that the crime to be punished 
by this language was meant to require more than know-
ingly making a threat; it also required some form of 
regime is a meaningful one: (1) the number of investigations 
or arrests and bookings compared to the number of indictments 
filed; (2) the number of cases filed compared with the number of 
cases that either go to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results 
at trial comparing rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts. In light 
of the purposes of this statute and the empirical data comparing 
the subjective and objective approaches to culpability under 
Section 871(a), this Article concludes that the Patillo approach 
best serves the state’s interests in protecting the President and 
his movements, balancing those priorities with the greatest 
amount of protection for individuals subject to the criminal 
sanction of Section 871(a).
II. THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT: THE  
STATUTORY LANGUAGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
EARLY CASES, AND THE RAGANSKY TEST
A. 18 U.S.C. SECTION 871 — THE STATUTE  
 CRIMINALIZING THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT
The crucial language in 18 U.S.C. Section 871(a) 
criminalizing threats to the President is that a true threat 
be made “knowingly and willfully.”20 Section 871(a) states:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for  
conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any  
post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, 
writing, print, missive, or document containing any 
threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily 
harm upon the President of the United States, the 
President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next  
in the order of succession to the office of President  
of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, or 
knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such 
threat against the President, President-elect, Vice 
President or other officer next in the order of succes-
sion to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both.21
This section prohibits two forms of threats against the 
President—by mailing “any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, 
or document containing any threat” or “otherwise mak[ing] any 
such threat. . . ” 22 Regardless of the method used to convey the 
threat, both require that it be made “knowingly and willfully.”23
Both the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States (1969) 
and the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Patillo (1971) 
emphasize that within this “knowingly and willfully” require-
ment, “willfully” is the decisive source of the mens rea of the 
statute.24 The Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock25 
explains that willfully “often denotes an act which is intentional, 
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criminal culpability, which according to Webb should have 
been the “intent to carry out a threat against the Executive.”39 He 
emphasized, “[t]his is the language used in nearly all the 
statutes where the intent constitutes the crime. You find it in 
the statutes against murder and embezzlement, and I had rather 
keep the word ‘willfully’ in.”40
Representative Volstead, also responding to Raker’s 
suggestion of eliminating willfully, stated that “[t]he word 
‘willful’ conveys, as ordinarily used, the idea of wrongful as 
well as intentional.”41 He also illustrated the harm that might 
befall someone if the word willfully were taken out of the bill.42 
He said:
This statute does not require that the instrument shall 
be sent to the President. It might be sent to some other 
person. If, as the gentleman suggests, you strike out the 
word ‘willfully,’ a person who simply sends an instru-
ment, say, a newspaper that contains such a threat, to 
some friend to call his attention to the matter, would 
do so knowingly, and would come within the language 
of this bill.43
In articulating this concern, Volstead raised a factual matter 
which influenced the Patillo court’s holding decades later—“a 
true threat against the person of the President . . . uttered without 
communication to the President intended.”44 In other words, the 
factual situation common in Section 871(a) cases, where the 
threat was not mailed to or spoken to the President or the Secret 
Service, but rather was mailed or spoken to some other person 
such as a friend, stranger, or coworker. The significance of this 
factual distinction and the relevance of willfulness in punishing 
such threats will be discussed in the section on Patillo below.
Interestingly, the significance of this debate and the early 
cases construing the statute figured prominently in D.C. Circuit 
Judge J. Skelly Wright’s dissent in Watts v. United States.45 This 
dissent was referenced later by the Supreme Court’s per curiam 
opinion when it reversed the D.C. Circuit and disposed of the 
case based upon the true threats analysis established by that 
landmark First Amendment decision, but not before the Court 
expressed its “grave doubts” about an objective standard for 
willfulness.46 In his dissent, Wright argues that courts should 
look to the legislative history for Section 871(a), particularly 
Webb’s statements, when performing statutory construction of 
Section 871(a).47
In a footnote, Wright stated, “[a] statute punishing a ‘threat’ 
made ‘knowingly and willfully’ is hardly so unambiguous as to 
preclude looking to the legislative history for clarification of 
the mental element required.”48 Wright was seemingly aware 
of the judicial canon of statutory construction which says that 
“[w]here . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a 
statute and the intention of Congress, [the Court] look[s] first 
to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if 
the statutory language is unclear,”49 and was therefore seeking 
to justify his reliance on Webb’s statement, given on the floor 
of the House. Wright goes on to argue that “[w]hat is clear is 
that Congressman Webb . . . insisted upon a specific intent to 
execute the threat. Because of the obvious dangers posed by the 
statute, and amply illustrated by the history of its use, I consider 
the narrower view of the mental element the proper one.”50 In 
his dissent, Wright laments the fact that the early cases which 
construed the law in 1917-18 “largely ignored” that “Congress 
considered specific intent to execute the threat an element of 
the offense.”51
C. RAGANSKY V. UNITED STATES — THE EARLY  
 CASE THAT SET THE STANDARD
Ragansky v. United States,52 decided in 1918 by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has become 
a seminal case in interpreting Section 871(a); it is known for 
creating the Ragansky Test. Walter Ragansky was charged 
and convicted on three counts of threatening the life of the 
President.53 His alleged threats were made orally in the presence 
of third-parties.54 The first count of the indictment alleged that 
Ragansky said, “I can make bombs and I will make bombs and 
blow up the President.”55 The second count stated that he said, 
“We ought to make the biggest bomb in the world and take it 
down to the White House and put it on the dome and blow up 
President Wilson and all the rest of the crooks, and get President 
Wilson and all of the rest of the crooks and blow it up.”56 The 
third count alleged that Ragansky said, “I would like to make a 
bomb big enough to blow up the Capitol and President and all 
the Senators and everybody in it.”57
Virtually every case and article citing Ragansky, men-
tions the statement made in the first count of the indictment,58 
despite the fact that the other two statements contain language 
of hyperbole. This is curious because Ragansky’s defense was 
that his statements were actually made in jest and that the jury 
charge ignored the word willfully in the statute.59 As the court 
noted, Ragansky’s claim “appear[ed] to have been that [he] 
had no intention to carry out his threat, and that, therefore, it 
was a joke.”60 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
conviction based upon the jury instruction that had been given.61 
Furthermore, the court elaborated on the meaning of the phrase 
“knowingly and willfully,”62 and its brief statement of those 
terms has since formed the basis of the Ragansky Test.
The Seventh Circuit first stated that “[a] threat is knowingly 
made, if the maker of it comprehends the meaning of the words 
uttered by him; a foreigner, ignorant of the English language, 
repeating these same words without knowledge of their mean-
ing, may not knowingly have made a threat.”63 Next, the court 
stated that, “[a] threat is willfully made, if in addition to compre-
hending the meaning of his words [(i.e., knowingly)], the maker 
voluntarily and intentionally utters them as the declaration of 
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an apparent determination to carry them into execution.”64 An 
“apparent determination” is an objective standard by which 
the fact finder must look at the words stated and then consider 
what a reasonable person would believe the speaker meant by 
those words.65 If the reasonable person believes the speaker was 
making a serious threat, then that is proof that the threat was 
made willfully. The test also incorporates a negligence standard, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, which rejected the notion that 
a prosecutor must prove the defendant “used [such language] 
with an evil or malicious intent to express a sentiment to be 
impressed upon the minds of persons through which it might 
create a sentiment of hostility to the security of the President, 
‘that willfully implies an evil purpose—legal malice.’”66
III. UNITED STATES V. PATILLO—THE  
MISUNDERSTOOD AND OFTEN OVERSIMPLIFIED HOLDING 
OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REGARDING SECTION 871(A)
In United States v. Patillo, decided by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by a panel decision 
in 1970 and an en banc decision in 1971, the defendant Patillo 
appealed his conviction on two counts of threatening the life 
of the President of the United States in violation of Section 
871(a).67 The district judge, in a bench trial, had found that 
Patillo made unlawful threats against President Nixon on two 
occasions while on duty as a security guard at the Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard.68 On May 16, 1969, he allegedly said to another guard 
“with whom he was only casually acquainted” that he was 
“going to kill President Nixon, and [was] going to Washington 
to do it.”69 This statement was reported to a supervisor who 
then informed the Secret Service.70 On May 22, 1969, a Secret 
Service agent was “secreted in the trunk of a patrol car” 
operated by Patillo and the same coworker.71 According to testi-
mony at trial, Patillo allegedly said “I will take care of [Nixon] 
personally,” and “would gladly give up [my] life doing it.”72 
After considering a recently decided case assessing the intent 
requirement for 18 U.S.C. Section 871(a), (i.e., Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)), the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
Patillo was “tried in accordance with legal principles that we 
have found to be erroneous,” and thus reversed and remanded 
his case for a new trial.73
Other opinions and secondary sources widely note that 
United States v. Patillo established a subjective “present intent” 
requirement for Section 871(a) offenses.74 This, however, is an 
oversimplification of the court’s holding. The specific language 
of Patillo demands greater inspection because it suggests that 
Patillo’s present intent requirement was meant to have a more 
narrow or limited application; it was not meant to apply to all 
Section 871(a) cases generally.75 In a crucial paragraph on page 
fifteen of the opinion en banc, the court wrote and held the 
following:
This case does not involve the communication, or  
attempted communication, by a defendant of his threat 
to the President. Accordingly, we do not here consider 
what intent requirement may be effective to accom-
plish an insulation of the President from threats of 
violence to his person and also be in accordance with 
the wording of Section 871(a). We hold that where, 
as in Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of 
the President is uttered without communication to the 
President intended the threat can form a basis for con-
viction under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made 
with a present intent to do injury to the President.76
This passage is so crucial to properly understanding the 
holding of Patillo that it must be analyzed one sentence at a 
time. First, the court identifies two categories of Section 871 
cases based upon the facts of such cases: those where the 
defendant communicates his threat directly “to the President 
intended” (e.g., by speaking or mailing a threat directly to the 
President or the Secret Service) and those where the defen-
dant does not communicate his threat directly to the President 
intended (e.g., by mailing a letter or saying something to a 
friend, stranger, or other third-party).77 The court identifies 
Patillo’s case as falling into the second category.78 Next, the 
court says that because the Patillo case does not involve the 
communication of a threat directly to the President intended, 
the court “do[es] not here consider what intent requirement may 
be effective to accomplish an insulation of the President from 
threats of violence to his person” under those conditions.79 This 
statement strongly indicates that the Fourth Circuit’s holding in 
Patillo was only meant to apply to the second category of cases: 
threats not directed to the President intended.
The Fourth Circuit’s own statement of the holding supports 
this interpretation. The court states, “[w]e hold that where, as in 
Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of the President is 
uttered without communication to the President intended,” (i.e., 
category two only), “the threat can form a basis for conviction 
under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made with a present 
intent to do injury to the President.”80 Thus, a careful reading 
of the holding in Patillo suggests that it should be narrowly 
applied to only one of two categories of Section 871(a) cases, 
not to all Section 871(a) cases generally.
This view that the Patillo holding created a factual 
dichotomy approach to analysis of Section 871(a) cases is 
acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit’s opinion thirty years later 
in United States v. Spring.81 In Spring, the court used Patillo as 
a basis of comparison, citing, “Cf. Patillo, 431 F.2d at 297-98 
(distinguishing among threats against the President based 
on whether they were transmitted (or were intended to be 
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transmitted) to the President or to a third party).”82 Although 
this statement validates the approach described above, it is a 
mere indirect reference to the dichotomy created by the hold-
ing. No reported case in the Fourth Circuit or elsewhere has 
expressly acknowledged the true holding of Patillo.
The significance of this dichotomy and the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding, requires further explanation. After stating its holding, 
the Patillo court discussed the purpose of the statute and the 
three ways of proving the present intent requirement in category 
two cases.83 The court wrote:
We agree with [the Second and Ninth Circuits] that the 
statute was designed to prevent a secondary evil other 
than actual assaults upon the President or incitement 
to assault the President, and that it is a legitimate area 
of congressional concern to prevent and make criminal  
disruption of presidential activity and movement that 
may result simply from publication of an apparent 
threat upon the President’s life. When a threat is pub-
lished with an intent to disrupt presidential activity, we 
think there is sufficient mens rea under the secondary 
sanction of the statute.84
In this passage, the Fourth Circuit acknowledges that there 
is a secondary sanction of the statute—the disruption of presi-
dential activity.85 Furthermore, the court rejects the Ragansky 
Test of intention—although properly understood, this rejection 
only applies to category two cases.86
For category two cases, the court describes three theories 
of a Section 871 offense:
We think that an essential element of guilt is a present  
intention either to injure the President, or incite others 
to injure him, or to restrict his movements, and that 
the trier of fact may find the latter intention from the 
nature of the publication of the threat, i.e., whether the 
person making the threat might reasonably anticipate 
that it would be transmitted to law enforcement officers 
and others charged with the security of the President.87
The phrase “the latter intention” refers to the third theory of 
the offense for category two cases: restricting the movements of 
the President.88 The court notes, “Much of what we say here is 
dicta justified, we think, by apparent misunderstanding of our 
prior panel decision. For Patillo was not prosecuted on a theory 
of intention to disrupt presidential activity and the nature of 
publication of his threat would scarcely support it.”89
The use of the term “publication” is somewhat confusing 
since Patillo did not mail or publish a threat, but was indicted 
for allegedly making verbal statements to a coworker on two 
separate occasions while the two security guards were on night 
patrol at a Norfolk based Naval Shipyard.90 Nevertheless, the 
court’s distinction of Patillo’s case, which was prosecuted 
under a theory of “present intention to injure the President,” as 
compared to the Ninth and Second Circuit decisions referred 
to in the opinion, which were prosecuted under a theory of 
“present intention to disrupt presidential activity,” is a very 
important one.91 It is a distinction which acknowledges the 
nuances of both the factual dichotomy of Section 871(a) cases 
noted above and the three different theories of prosecution 
under Section 871(a). It also helps inform the Patillo court’s 
demarcation of category one and category two cases.
The framework of Section 871(a) offenses post-Patillo can 
be viewed as follows:




Verbal or  
Written Threats 
Directed to the 
President
(1) to injure 
the President
The Fourth Circuit did not 
make a holding on this issue 
in Patillo and thus deferred 
deciding whether there is a 
subjective present intent re-
quirement or some form of an 




Directed to the 
President
(2) to incite 
others to  
injure the 
President
The Fourth Circuit did not 
make a holding on this issue 
in Patillo and thus deferred 
deciding whether there is a 
subjective present intent re-
quirement or some form of an 
objective intent requirement. 
TWO:
Verbal or  
Written Threats 
Not Directed  
to the President
(1) to injure 
the President
Must prove defendant had— 
at the time the threat was 
made—the present intent to 
injure the President at some 
point in the future.
TWO:
Verbal or  
Written Threats 
Not Directed  
to the President
(2) to incite 
others to  
injure the 
President
Must prove defendant had— 
at the time the threat was 
made—the present intent  
to incite other to injure the 
President at some point in  
the future.
TWO:
Verbal or  
Written Threats 
Not Directed  
to the President
(3) to disrupt 
presidential 
activity or the 
movements of 
the President
Must prove defendant had— 
at the time the threat was 
made—the present intent to 
disrupt presidential activity  
or the movements of the Presi-
dent. This can be demonstrated 
by showing that the defendant 
published or uttered a statement 
that is a true threat, with an  
intent to disrupt presidential 
activity (e.g., calling the police, 
calling a telephone operator).92
Patillo’s case falls under category two and was prosecuted 
under theory one (see table above). Therefore, the court’s 
specific concern in Patillo was what intent requirement best 
suits a defendant who makes a verbal statement to a coworker, 
not directly to the President intended or to persons in authority 
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positions likely to convey such information to the Secret Service 
or Office of the President. The court writes:
As to Patillo’s case which is quite different from Roy’s 
and Compton’s, we adhere to the panel decision . . . 
adding to it only that the trier of fact may, of course, 
consider all relevant facts concerning the background 
of the defendant, his motives, the manner in which the 
threat was made, and the reaction of those who heard 
the threat and thus have an opportunity to form an 
opinion about the speaker’s present intention to injure 
the President of the United States.93
Because of the significant effort the court makes to clearly 
distinguish between category one and two, and between theories 
of the offense for category two, these factors must apply only to 
cases prosecuted under category two.
These distinctions are sensible because Section 871(a) has 
the potential to criminalize a wide variety of writings or verbal 
statements made in vastly different contexts and directed to 
many different types of people. The Fourth Circuit in Patillo 
was most concerned with establishing a proper standard for 
individuals making statements that could be perceived as true 
threats, in casual conversation with individuals not in a position 
of authority, or likely to transmit such statements to the Secret 
Service or the Office of the President.94 In such factual scenarios, 
the Fourth Circuit deemed it necessary that the individual ut-
tering a true threat must have the present intent at the time the 
statement was made, to injure the President at some point in the 
future, including injuring the President by disrupting his future 
movements.95
This present intent requirement would effectively sort out 
those for punishment who were truly culpable under category 
two cases (those not made directly to the President intended), by 
dividing persons making true threats into two groups: first, those 
who are culpable, because they wrote or uttered true threats 
and meant to injure the President or carry out those threats at 
a future point in time, and second, those who are not culpable, 
because even though they wrote or uttered true threats, they had 
no present intention to actually injure the President or carry out 
those threats. A careful and scrutinizing reading of the Patillo 
opinion, however, indicates that such factors have limited 
application to category two cases and do not apply to category 
one cases. Thus, category one cases might still be subject to 
an objective intent standard or a more relaxed subjective intent 
standard (intent to make a true threat, though not necessarily 
with the intent to injure the President or to carry out the threat) 
even under Patillo.
IV. 18 U.S.C. § 879 AND CONGRESS’S INITIAL  
RESPONSE TO THE CULPABILITY CONTROVERSY IN  
§ 871(A) CASE LAW
Other federal criminal statutes prohibiting threats can be 
found in several sections of the United States Code, includ-
ing 18 U.S.C. Sections 112(b) (threatening a foreign official), 
115 (threatening a Federal official, judge, or law enforcement 
officer or member of their immediate family), 844(e) (threatened 
use of arson or explosive), 871 (threats against the President and 
successor to the Presidency), 875 (threats contained in interstate 
communications), 876 (mailing threatening communications), 
877 (mailing threatening communications from a foreign 
country), 878 (threats against foreign officials, official guests, 
or internationally protected persons), and 879 (threats against 
former Presidents and certain other persons).96 In addition to 
Section 871(a), Sections 878 and 879 use the phraseology of 
“knowingly and willfully.”97
Section 878 punishes “Whoever knowingly and willfully 
threatens to violate section 112, 1116, or 1201 . . . under [Title 
18].”98 18 U.S.C. Section 879 is actually a counterpart to Section 
871 and was patterned off of it.99 Section 879 extends the pro-
tections of Section 871 from just the President and successor 
to the Presidency to include former Presidents and the immedi-
ate family of a former President, the immediate family of the 
President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice 
President-elect, a major candidate for the office of President or 
Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such a 
candidate, or any person protected by the Secret Service under 
Section 3056(a)(6).100 Section 879 also uses the same exact 
phraseology “knowingly and willfully.”101
Interestingly, Section 879 was passed in 1982,102 whereas 
§ 871 was passed more than a half-century earlier.103 Thus 
Congress was well aware of the controversy that had arisen in 
the aftermath of Watts regarding the proper culpability stan-
dard. This is evident from the House of Representatives Report 
97-725 in which the Judiciary Committee stated that:
The committee is aware that the term ‘knowingly and 
willfully’ as used in Section 871 has not been uniformly 
construed by the courts. Some courts have broadly 
construed the term, in accord with the explicit pur-
pose of the legislation to prevent interference with the 
conduct of presidential duties, and have not required 
evidence of intent to carry out the threatened act. . . 
. One court has required evidence of an individual’s  
intent to carry out the threat [(referring to Patillo in  
a footnote)].104
Although Congress acknowledged the circuit split on this 
issue, their one line reference to the holding of Patillo is an 
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oversimplification of the standard set by the Patillo court, as 
this analysis has shown. Furthermore, Congress did nothing 
to address Section 871(a), only to put a different standard for 
“willfully” in Section 879.105
Indeed, the committee went on to say, “With regard to 
Section 879 . . . the committee construes a threat that is ‘know-
ingly and willfully’ made as one which the maker intends to be 
perceived as a threat regardless of whether he or she intends 
to carry it out.”106 As expressed 
through a footnote, the commit-
tee essentially adopted Justice 
Marshall’s subjective construc-
tion—requiring proof of subjec-
tive intent to make a true threat, 
but not necessarily to carry out 
that threat.107 The committee justi-
fied its implementation of Section 
879 because of the fact that “[t]he 
investigation and prosecution of 
such threats has been hampered 
because of a lack of an applicable 
federal statute similar to the presi-
dential threat statute.”108
When comparing different 
threats statutes, confusion often 
arises. One source of confusion is caused by a blending of the 
true threats analysis with the mens rea requirements of a given 
threats statute. Each specific statement of law in a given case 
may not be an error in and of itself. Yet, the blending together 
of such tests for the purposes of one case, often leads to confu-
sion when the language of those opinions or jury instructions 
laying out the blended test are then relied upon in other cases or 
jurisdictions dealing with the same or a different threats statute. 
This problem has been recognized in some secondary sources.109 
True threats tests ensure compliance with First Amendment 
protections while mens rea culpability requirements set the bar 
for what non-constitutionally-protected verbal or non-verbal 
utterances are blameworthy under the purposes of the statute 
involved. As a matter of legal analysis, it makes sense to 
draw a line in the sand on this issue and to consider each test 
independently, rather than blend the inquiries together.110 Such 
clarity could assist judges and lawmakers in developing the law 
of threats in a manner that minimizes confusion and maximizes 
just and constitutional principles.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT — § 871(A)  
ACROSS THE CIRCUITS TODAY
Analyzing the United States Courts of Appeal for the First 
through Eleventh Circuits and the D.C. Circuit reveals that there 
are three operating standards for the willfulness element of 
Section 871(a). The first and largest category is the Roy/Ragansky 
standard to which nine circuits clearly adhere.111 Although, 
the First Circuit has not clearly decided the issue, it seems to 
favor the Roy/Ragansky standard.112 The second and third cat-
egories are both subjective standards, but both are “categories 
of one”: the Fourth Circuit’s Patillo standard and the Eighth 
Circuit’s Marshall Test.113
A. THE RAGANSKY  
TEST AS EXPRESSED IN  
ROY AND ADOPTED IN 
OTHER CIRCUITS
In Roy v. United States, 
decided by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
1969, the court elaborated a stan-
dard based on the 1918 Ragansky 
Test.114 The court wrote:
This Court therefore con-
strues the willfulness re-
quirement of [18 U.S.C. 
§ 871(a)] to require only 
that the defendant in-
tentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a 
context or under such circumstances wherein a rea-
sonable person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker  
communicates the statement as a serious expression of 
an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the 
life of the President, and that the statement not be the 
result of mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does 
not require that the defendant actually intend to carry 
out the threat.115
Circuits adopting the Roy/Ragansky standard sometimes 
use language more akin to that used in Ragansky,116 although 
regardless of the language, the test objectively views the words 
written or spoken from the perspective of a reasonable person. 
For example, in United States v. Compton, the Second Cir-
cuit expressly approved117 of the lower courts jury instruction 
which read:
[I]f it found that a true threat was made, it must further  
find that the threat was made ‘knowingly and will-
fully,’ and that ‘the government must establish beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant comprehended 
the words he uttered, that he voluntarily and inten-
tionally uttered them with the apparent determination  
to carry them into execution.’ . . . ‘Although for a find-
Such clarity could assist 
judges and lawmakers in 
developing the law of threats 
in a manner that minimizes 
confusion and maximizes just 
and constitutional principles.
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ing of guilt it is not necessary for you to find that the 
defendant actually intended to carry out the threat.’118
This instruction replicates the language of the Ragansky Test 
for willfulness.119 Yet, the Second Circuit cited Roy, not 
Ragansky, in its opinion.120 It expressed agreement with the 
Ninth Circuit’s Roy standard and that standard adopted by the 
District of Columbia Circuit, while simultaneously approving 
the jury charge stated above based on Ragansky.121
Then in a subsequent decision by the Second Circuit, the 
court noted that under Compton, “this court adopt[s] the objec-
tive test set forth in Roy . . .”122 The Second Circuit also stated 
that “[i]t is well settled that § 871 requires only a showing 
of general intent.”123 Following the Ninth Circuit in Roy, this 
standard—here referred to as the Roy/Ragansky Test—was 
adopted by the Second,124 Third,125 Fifth, 126 Sixth,127 Seventh,128 
Tenth,129 Eleventh,130 and D.C. Circuits.131 The First Circuit 
has not expressly addressed this direct issue on appeal, but has 
implied a preference for the objective standard.132
B. THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT CIRCUITS —  
 THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S PRESENT INTENT  
 REQUIREMENT AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S  
 MARSHALL TEST
In United States v. Frederickson, decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1979, the court 
reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in a Section 871(a) 
case on appeal.133 The court explained:
Here the district court[‘s charge to the jury] adopted 
the construction of section 871 enunciated by Mr.  
Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Rogers 
v. United States, []. As no objection was made to those 
instructions, the Rogers view of the statute constitutes 
the law of this case, against which we measure the  
sufficiency of the evidence.
Thus, for the purposes of this case, to obtain a con-
viction under section 871 the Government was  
required to establish ‘that the defendant appreciated 
the threatening nature of his statement and intended 
at least to convey the impression that the threat was  
a serious one.’134
The Eighth Circuit was apparently trying only to resolve 
the case before it and seemed to be going out of its way to 
emphasize that the Marshall Test from Rogers was not the 
newly adopted standard of the Eighth Circuit.135 Nevertheless, 
this exemplifies how a limited holding has been given a life 
beyond its original holding.
In United States v. Cvijanovich, decided in 2009, the Eighth 
Circuit stated that under Section 871(a), “[t]he government must 
establish ‘that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature 
of his statement and intended at least to convey the impres-
sion that the threat was a serious one.’”136 The court cites its 
Frederickson opinion for support and quotes from the language 
of Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in Rogers.137 Thus, 
the Marshall Test appears to be Eighth Circuit law, despite the 
limitations originally placed on the holding in Frederickson. 
While this standard is a subjective standard, it is not quite the 
same as the Patillo test, which requires not simply a subjective 
intent to make a true threat, but a subjective present intent to 
carry out the threat or injure the President.138 Therefore, while 
both the Patillo (as applied to category two cases) and the 
Marshall tests are subjective, the quantum of proof required to 
establish the subjective intent element of the Patillo test is a 
much higher burden—or at least is presumed to be theoretically.
The Patillo holding and the present intent standard has 
been laid out in detail above and need not be repeated; however, 
it is worth noting at this point that the court in Patillo, when 
comparing its standard to that in Roy, stated, “[i]t was in [the 
same] context that the Ninth Circuit opinion contained the state-
ment: ‘The statute does not require that the defendant actually 
intend to carry out the threat.’ . . . Our panel decision in this case 
is not to the contrary.”139 How can one reconcile the statement 
that their Patillo decision was not contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
Roy standard? Presumably, the Patillo court was creating (or 
thought it was creating) a limited holding that distinguished 
Roy from Patillo, and was not establishing a different standard 
for category one cases like Roy. Since other circuits, secondary 
sources, and even the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent cases have 
not clearly and explicitly acknowledged this dichotomy, for the 
purposes of the following empirical analysis, it will be presumed 
that the present intent standard has been applied uniformly to 
all Fourth Circuit cases, regardless of the factual circumstances 
of each case. This may prove to be a faulty assumption, but it 
is necessary to attempt a cross-circuit comparison of Section 
871(a) standards using the data which is available.
VI. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF 
A PRESENT INTENT STANDARD ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
PROSECUTIONS, AND VERDICTS IN § 871 CASES
Theoretically, anything that adds to the burden of proof 
for a given offense should affect the decisions investigators, 
prosecutors, defendants, and defense attorneys make. As addi-
tional elements are added—such as a specific intent element—
or as the mens rea requirement becomes difficult or complex 
to prove, one would expect that investigators would convert 
fewer investigations to arrests, prosecutors would file charges 
in a smaller percentage of investigations, that defendants would 
take their chances going to trial more often, and that sentences 
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would be proportionate to the degree of culpability or crimi-
nal blameworthiness. This is the framework from which this 
empirical study was developed.
These assumptions, on their face, are reasonable. For 
example, the Third Circuit noted in United States v. Kosma 
that “[a] subjective test makes it considerably more difficult 
for the government to prosecute threats against the President. 
While this might be tolerable in other contexts, the compelling, 
and indeed paramount, interest in safeguarding the President 
dictates otherwise,” thus justifying the adoption of an objective 
standard.140 It is also important to note that much of the schol-
arly discussion of the law of threats is based upon assumptions 
that the standards we choose will actually have an impact in 
the application of the law. This makes such an empirical study 
important, because it affords an opportunity to examine what is 
actually happening in practice, and to determine whether theory 
aligns with reality.
This empirical study is based upon the analysis of data 
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Federal Criminal Case 
Processing Statistics database.141 Three measures were used 
to test whether the Fourth Circuit’s present intent standard, as 
compared with all other circuits, has resulted in differences 
in: (1) the number of investigations or arrests and bookings 
compared to the number of indictments filed; (2) the number 
of cases filed compared with the number of cases that either go 
to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results at trial comparing 
rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts.
A. MEASURE ONE: FROM INVESTIGATION  
 OR ARREST TO INDICTMENT
During the twelve-year period of 1998 to 2009, there 
were 2,224 investigations concluded for threats made against 
the President.142 Of those investigations, prosecutors declined 
prosecutions seventy-eight percent of the time and cases were 
filed eighteen percent of the time.143 Unfortunately, due to the 
nature in which investigations data is tracked, the data cannot be 
categorized by circuit. The only way to make circuit-to-circuit 
comparisons of defendants moving from the investigatory 
stage to the prosecutorial stage is by comparing, by circuit, 
arrests to indictments and felony information proceedings. The 
arrests data did not include the variable specifically for threats 
against the President, but only for threatening communications; 
therefore, to best approximate the number of arrests for threats 
against the President by circuit, a special formula was used;144 
there is likely some error, leaning towards an underestimation 
of the total number of arrests.
The analysis of the conversion rate from arrests to indict-
ments produced the following results: of 390 total arrests across 
all circuits, there were 337 indictments filed, which is an 86.41 
percent conversion rate; of forty arrests in the Fourth Circuit, 
forty indictments were filed, which is a one hundred percent 
conversion rate; of the 350 arrests across all other circuits, there 
were 329 indictments filed, which is an 84.86 percent conversion 
rate.145 These results do not correspond with the theoretical 
expectation that the more elements one must prove, or the more 
difficult the mens rea is to prove, the less likely prosecutors will 
be to accept cases. While the percentage breakdown may suffer 
from some degree of error, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit 
conversion rate is above the average and the all other circuit 
conversion rate is just below the average. Regardless of degree, 
the opposite arrangement was expected. There are two alterna-
tive explanations for these results. First, it is possible that due 
to the higher burden of proof, agents have grown accustomed 
to the heightened requirements of the Fourth Circuit’s standard, 
and thus only arrest suspects when it is believed that a solid 
case has been built. A second possibility is that the distinction 
between an objective and a subjective mens rea standard does 
not actually translate into a perceptible difference in practice.
B. MEASURE TWO: FROM INDICTMENT TO TRIAL
The second potential measure of a difference between 
the Fourth Circuit standard and that of other circuits is the 
rate at which defendants pursue trial versus making a plea. 
The extraordinarily high conviction rate of the United States 
Attorney’s Office is well known. The overall conviction rate 
from 1998 to 2009 is 893,187 convictions out of 999,412 cases, 
or 89.37 percent.146 The Fourth Circuit, however, has the lowest 
conviction rate among all the circuits: 89,971 convictions out 
of 111,905 cases, or 80.40 percent.147 This, combined with the 
Fourth Circuit’s present intent requirement for Section 871(a), 
would suggest that more defendants and defense attorneys 
would pursue going to trial over taking a plea and would likely 
prefer a jury trial over a bench trial. This second assumption, 
however, is based on the presumption that it would be harder 
to convince a jury of twelve lay persons to convict rather than 
one judge.
The data, however, does not reflect this assumption. In 
the Fourth Circuit, only 8.11 percent of cases proceed to trial, 
compared with 12.16 percent in all other circuits from 1998 
to 2009.148 More surprisingly, only three cases went to trial in 
the Fourth Circuit in that same twelve-year period.149 Of those 
three cases, two were tried before a judge, and only one was 
tried before a jury.150 The jury trial resulted in an acquittal and 
the two bench trials resulted in guilty convictions.151 Due to the 
small number of Section 871(a) cases which go to trial overall, 
especially in the Fourth Circuit, it is difficult to tell whether 
these conversion rates are significant in testing the hypoth-
esis that the Fourth Circuit’s present intent requirement would 
result in more cases going to trial and more acquittals. There are 
also other alternatives to consider, such as the possibility that 
the difference between an objective mens rea standard and a 
subjective mens rea standard is not all that different in practice. 
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Another possibility is that federal prosecutors are very adept 
in selecting cases with sufficient evidence to prosecute; thus, 
regardless of the standard employed by the circuit, the results 
turn out similarly.
C. MEASURE THREE: RESULTS AT TRIAL
As indicated in the section above, defendants in the Fourth 
Circuit have not fared well at trial, with two out of three 
defendants being convicted in the last twelve years and only 
one acquitted.152 In the Fourth Circuit, sixty-seven percent 
of defendants at trial were convicted and thirty-three percent 
acquitted compared with forty-five percent of defendants in all 
other circuits convicted and fifty-five percent acquitted.153 The 
fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who 
went to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent 
difficulty of prosecuting Threats against the President cases 
in general. It also questions the assumption that proving an 
objective standard will be easy. This data indicates that in 
practice there is far less of a distinction between subjective and 
objective willfulness standards in Section 871(a) cases than 
commentators and judges previously thought.
In order to test whether the data is just too small to properly 
measure the distinction between the Patillo standard and the 
other standards, which do not require a showing of intent to 
injure the President or carry out the threat, an additional com-
parison was made. Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit (soft 
subjective standard) data were combined and compared against 
all other circuits (limited to the Roy/Ragansky standard). This 
analysis shows a slightly different outcome, but not dramatically 
so. When combining Fourth and Eighth Circuit data, defen-
dants who went to trial on a subjective standard were acquitted 
fifty-seven percent (four of seven) of the time and convicted 
forty-three percent (three of seven).154 This compares with fifty-
two percent of defendants (fourteen of twenty-seven) acquitted 
under the Roy/Ragansky Test and forty-eight percent convicted 
(thirteen of twenty-seven).155 While isolating the strong and 
weak subjective intent standards into one category did cause 
the acquittal rate to exceed that of the objective standard, it was 
only by a few percentage points and just one different outcome 
in a single case would shift those numbers. Perhaps more 
importantly, once the acquittal and conviction rates are isolated, 
they became more equalized, rather than polarized. This further 
adds to the evidence that the subjective and objective distinction 
is not a meaningful one in application.
VII. THE PATILLO STANDARD, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, 
DESERVES RECOGNITION AS THE BEST STANDARD FOR 
THE UNITED STATES GOING FORWARD
As the empirical assessment above reveals, the objective 
mens rea standard of the Roy/Ragansky Test may not be the 
boogeyman that some, including the Watts Court, feared it to 
be.156 Although the available data is probably insufficient to 
draw ironclad conclusions, it seems safe to conclude that there 
is parity between the subjective present intent standard and 
the objective standard in terms of influencing conversion rates 
for arrests, indictments, trials, and acquittals in Section 871(a) 
cases. Does this necessarily support the assertion of those 
champions of the status quo—that there is no true “conflict” 
between the circuits to be resolved? No. Congress is consider-
ing amending Section 871(a) to apply to all congressmen and 
congressmen-elect.157 If they proceed on that path, it seems 
necessary, for the sake of consistency, that they choose one 
standard over the other and include in the statute the definition 
of the term “willfully.”
The issue remains whether a free nation like the United 
States should be willing to have a Presidential threat statute that 
criminally punishes offenders with a maximum of five years in 
prison, without showing some subjective criminal culpability to 
either injure the President or carry out the threat (hard subjective 
standard) or at least that the speaker had the intent for his words 
to be considered a serious threat to the President (soft subjective 
standard). In short, the idea that we would punish persons using 
a negligence standard for statements that could be construed as 
true threats, but not intended as threats, is problematic and runs 
contrary to the tradition of criminal law in the United States.158 
Even if adopting a subjective intent standard will not dramati-
cally change the outcomes of investigations and prosecutions, 
as the data suggests, it is probably worth taking this stand on 
The fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who went 
to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent difficulty 
of prosecuting Threats against the President cases in general. It also 
questions the assumption that proving an objective standard will be easy.
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principle alone: that the United States will not punish people 
for felonies without being criminally culpable for their crimes.
Proponents of the Roy/Ragansky standard are likely to 
object, citing the great need to protect the President’s person 
and his ability to perform his duties without interference as jus-
tification for an objective standard, at least for Section 871(a) 
threats. This rationale seems dated and disconnected from the 
complex reality of fending off assassination attempts and effec-
tively investigating and monitoring those who would interfere 
with Office of the President by making threats. By 1998, the 
United States Secret Service had completed an operational 
study, the Exceptional Case Study Project, of the thinking and 
behavior of the eighty-three persons known to have attacked, or 
come close to attacking, prominent public officials and figures 
in the United States during the past fifty years.159 This study 
revealed that it is a myth that “persons most likely to carry out 
attacks are those who make direct threats.”160 In fact, “[p]ersons 
who pose an actual threat often do not make threats, especially 
direct threats.”161
Indeed researchers demonstrated that of the eighty-three 
persons in the study, only twenty-seven (thirty-seven percent) 
had a history of making verbal or written direct threats about the 
target, only three (four percent) made such threats directly to the 
target of the threats, and only five (seven percent) made such 
threats directly to the target or law enforcement.162 Those last 
two statistics help justify the factual dichotomy created by the 
Patillo court when it distinguished between those defendants 
who made threats “directly to the President intended,” and those 
who did not. Since the more serious threat—an attack to the 
person of the President—is not likely to be prevented merely 
by enforcing the provisions of Section 871(a), the other goal 
of the statute—preventing disruption of the President’s move-
ments and duties—should weigh more heavily in deciding the 
standard to be employed.
Research conducted by economists Benjamin Olken and 
Benjamin Jones also indicates that assassination attempts have 
had a less significant impact on democratized states compared 
with autocracies.163 The authors concluded, “assassinations 
of autocrats produce substantial changes in the country’s institu-
tions.”164 Yet, “the . . . assassination of democrats produces no 
change in institutions.”165 In other words, democracies are more 
resistant to the destabilizing effects of the loss of political lead-
ers. Considering the peaceful uprisings in the Middle East and 
North Africa during 2011,166 and the often violent responses to 
such movements by autocratic rulers, including the curtailing 
of dissenters’ speech, assembly, and electronic communication 
capabilities, it is worth reflecting for a moment as to why this 
is the case. Democracies promote and protect values such as 
free speech. The criminal law in democratized states, especially 
the United States, typically demands that the government meet 
the highest burden of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt.167 
The criminal law in the Anglo-American tradition typically 
requires proof of criminal blameworthiness, especially in 
the case of felonies, which are punishable by more than a 
year in prison.168 Such protections strengthen the institutions 
of democracy and instill in the people a sense that even sense-
less and shocking attacks, such as the assassination attempt of 
Representative Giffords, can be met with the peaceful resolve 
of a democratic society.169
The Patillo court’s 1971 holding deserves recognition 
as establishing a standard which best balances all interests 
involved in Section 871(a) cases. Properly understood, the 
Patillo holding created a subjective present intent requirement 
for category two cases (threats not directed to the President 
intended) that required proof of slightly different present intents 
in each case, based upon the theory of the case, including the 
third theory of disrupting presidential activity or the move-
ments of the President. The court left open the possibility that a 
different standard might be adopted in category one cases (those 
directed to the President intended).170 After all, when a person 
has taken the extra step of not only making a threat, but delib-
erately finding a way to direct that threat to the attention of the 
President (by mailing it to the White House, calling the White 
House, etc.), it is reasonable that a less demanding standard 
might be employed because the nature of the harm is more clear 
and the deliberateness of the act is more palpable. Thus, either 
the Roy/Ragansky Test or the Marshall Test could be adopted 
for category one cases and still be in line with the holding of 
Patillo. Such a mixed standard in Section 871(a) cases is the 
best possible standard going forward to protect the movements 
and duties of the President, to allow for effective investigations 
of assassination threats, and to protect the integrity of criminal 
law in America and our democratic institutions. This standard, 
coupled with the First Amendment protections of the threshold 
in Watts’ “true threat” analysis, strikes the best possible balance 
for a statute like Section 871(a).
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1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the use of reasonable person analysis of 
presidential threats), with Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 n.14 (noting that 
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(“We believe the objective, reasonable person standard is the correct 
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Ragansky).
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119 See, e.g., Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918) 
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122 United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Compton, 428 F.2d at 21 (quoting Roy, 416 F.2d at 877-78)).
123 Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
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to carry out the threat”).
125 See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
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142 See id. (selecting Law Enforcement — Suspects in investigations 
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138, supra. Indictment data was obtained by circuit was obtained using 
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149 See id.
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54 Spring 2012
calculated separately, with variables: U.S. Circuit Courts > Outcome for 
a defendant in a case > Filing Offense = Threats against the President. 
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